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IN THE SUPREME COUKT 01'' Till'. STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST EQUI•^ CORPORATION n: 
FLORIDA . «-: ]' i or id.-i corpo* a L i on , 
I • 
• V s -
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a i-<»-\ 
politic and corporate, and 
DONALD A. CATRON, an individual, 
Defendant-Respondent 
BEAR-STEARNS & CO., HARRIS 
UPHAM & CO., INC., HORNBLOWER 
& WEEKS-HEMPHILL, NOYES, INC., 
LEHMAN BROTHERS, INC., MERRILL 
LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, 
INC., SHEARSON, HAYDEN, STONE, 
INC. and SUTRO & CO., INC., 
Amici Curiae. 
CASE NO. 13798 
APPELLANT'^ RK!'LY BRIEF 
a^sNT 
POINT I 
USU'S CONTRACTS WITH FIRST EQUITY WERE NOT ULTRA VIRES. 
Respo • • >eal s i g n i f i c a n t l y m i s s t a t e s b.-ih 
the porii - . n of F i : -'. EquJL*. a ' i ! c e r t a i n a s p e c t ? ^f . lovan t law, 
and t h^ r . i , re r e q t n o - . . ' se iecLeu q u e s t i o n s 
e f f e c t 01 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o u s concern ing p r e - e x i s t i n g 
r i g h t s and powers of USU. 
USU < ~ y i s i.a L i v e Ac L ^ J. 
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1888 (Corap. Laws of Utah §§1852 e^t. seq.) could in no way have con-
ferred general investment powers on USU is undercut by the language 
(cited on page 17 of the Brief prepared by counsel for the amici 
curiae brokers in this appeal) of the 1929 statute contained in 
Sec. 15, ch. 41, Laws of Utah, which clearly affirms a legislative 
intent to invest the University with broad, general, and independent 
powers to manage its financial affairs. The subsequent repeal of 
that statute has no effect upon its significance as legislative 
history and as a reflection of legislative attitude. 
To maintain that broad and general powers of investment were 
granted is not, however, to argue that the University is totally 
free from the control of the Legislature. Appellant here does not 
make an argument "virtually identical11 to the one urged by the Uni-
versity in University of Utah vs. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 
295 P.2d 348 (1956) as Respondent claims on page 14 of its Brief. 
In that case, the issue was whether or not the rights,,"immunities, 
franchises and endowments11 vested in the University by the Utah 
Constitution were to be free from the conditions and limitations 
placed thereon by the territorial legislature to the same effect as 
if no condition or limitation had been included in the territorial 
legislation. This Court concluded that such was not the case, but 
that the rights and powers perpetuated in the University were those 
existing prior to the adoption of the Constitution a_s limited by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the territorial legislation. The territorial act of 1892 
in effect declared this is the status and 
these are the powers of the University but 
they are not static, they are subject to 
the laws of Utah from time to time enacted. 
It in effect declared the University is a 
public corporation, but not a corporation 
above the Legislature. It shall always be 
subject to the laws of Utah. 
295 P.2d at 357. 
The extensive language of that case quoted by Respondent is relevant 
only in the context of the issues of that case, which were different 
from those of instant case. Respondent errs in its claim that this 
appeal is "plainly controlled11 by the earlier decision. Respondents 
use of that case is inapposite at best, since First Equity in no way 
espouses the position of the University of Utah that state universi-
ties are totally autonomous and outside the control of the Legislature. 
Rather, Appellant agrees with the Court in that case that USU is 
subject to the control of and limitations imposed by the legislature; 
Appellant argues only that such control and limitations permitted 
the University to invest in common stock. 
More relevant to this appeal is that portion of University of 
Utah vs. Board of Examiners which recites the following principle 
of construction from 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law §32, at 70: 
In determining the meaning of an ambiguous 
constitutional provision, the courts may 
properly seek extrinsic aid by ascertaining 
the construction at the time of its adoption 
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and since by those whose duty it has been to 
construe, execute, and apply it in practice. 
The facts of this case upon which both parties are in agree-
ment clearly establish that those persons whose duty it was to 
construe and apply the powers available to them under the total 
framework of Utah law believed that the University had power to 
invest in common stock. In addition, it is arguable that the long-
standing investment practices of Utahfs public universities, including 
the purchase and sale of common stock, are so commonly known as to 
warrant judicial notice being taken of them. In any case, the entire 
record below establishes that the Utah State Board of Regents, the 
USU Institutional Council, officers and employees of USUfs financial 
management departments, and counsel at the Utah State Attorney 
Generalfs Office all believed USU to be empowered to purchase common 
stock. Respondent points out that evidence on this question was not 
offered below, and argues that the Court may draw an inference from 
this fact that the evidence would have been unfavorable to First 
Equity. In the court below, First Equity took the position that the 
ultra vires issue was totally irrelevant since agency and estoppel 
doctrines in any event required a finding in its favor. On that 
basis, evidence concerning the pattern and practice was not relevant 
at that time. However, if this Court determines that the statutes in j 
question in this appeal are ambiguous (and the opposing views taken i 
by the parties in their briefs mights well support such a determinatior 
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Appellants would join amici in suggesting that the court below be 
instructed to consider evidence on the question on remand. 
2. Interpretation of §33-1-1. 
.•..•'.'•'Respondent's view of 4A Utah Code Annotated ("U.C.A.") 
§33-1-1 as an enabling provision, despite the attempt to curcumvent 
the implications of its position for private entities in its Brief 
at page 23, must fail in light of the unambiguous language of the 
statute itself, heretofore cited by Appellant on pages 18-19 of its 
Brief. The title of S.B. 158 (Laws of Utah, 1939) enacting §33-1-1 
is, in this case, irrelevant according to Respondent's cited canon 
of construction since the statute is in no way ambiguous: it says 
quite clearly that the described entities may lawfully invest in the 
described securities. The entities so described include "private, 
political, or public11 instrumentalities, bodies, corporations and 
persons. The fact that the statutory title does not mention private 
entities, as pointed out by Respondent, is not of earthshaking signifi-
cance, since the title also fails to mention a number of other classes 
of potential investors whose coverage by the statute Respondent is 
unlikely to challenge, for example: receivers, municipalities, a state 
insurance fund, state sinking fund, or state school fund, and any 
board, commission or officer of the state government. Thus, Respon-
dent's attempt to avoid the extreme and untenable implications of its 
interpretation of §33-1-1 is unconvincing. Appellant reemphasizes 
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the language of the statute itself is controlling and that language 
contemplates already existing powers to invest funds. If new 
powers of investment theretofore non-existent were intended to be 
brought into being by §33-1-1, the canons of statutory construction 
urged upon this Court by Respondent, at pages 18-22 of Respondents 
Brief, would certainly require a clear and affirmative grant of such 
powers. Section 33-1-1 not only contains no language which could 
be so construed, but also it does contain language which contradicts 
that interpretation. Respondent^ position requires the absurd 
conclusion that, prior to the enactment of §33-1-1, USU had no power 
to invest in anything, nor did any of the entities described in that 
section. Such a conclusion flies in the face of common sense and 
the extensive legislative history and statutory language before this 
Court. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF USU HAD NO AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE COMMON STOCK, IT 
HAD AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT FOR FIRST EQUITY'S SERVICES, AND IS LIABLE 
ON THOSE CONTRACTS FOR THE VALUE OF THOSE SERVICES. 
USU states that First Equity should not be allowed to argue 
before this Court that it was USUfs agent because it did not raise the 
argument in the court below. See Respondent's Brief at page 44. 
The authorities cited by USU to support its statement are clearly 
distinguishable from this case. 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954), 
involved an appellant who sought to have the decision below reversed 
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because he had asked the court to give erroneous instructions to 
the jury. No objection to the instructions had been raised, but on 
the basis of appellantfs instructions, the jury had found against 
him. This Court determined that the appellant could not assign as 
error the giving of his own instructions. In Davis v. Mulholland, 
25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970), the appellant had tried his 
contract rescission claim on the theory that there had been a mutual 
mistake of fact. On appeal from the judgment against him, the appel-
lant argued for reversal on the theory that there had been a unilateral 
mistake of fact. This Court stated: 
Ordinarily an appellant cannot change his theory 
of the case on appeal from that presented to the 
court below. 
475 P.2d at 834. 
First Equity does not now seek to reverse on the basis of its 
own errors below, nor has First Equity changed its theory on appeal. 
First Equity claimed in its Complaint that it was a registered 
securities broker and that it had entered into agreements with USU 
to purchase securities for USU. The confirmations of the transactions, 
copies of which are attached to the Complaint, each state: tfAS 
BROKER, WE HAVE PURCHASED FOR YOUR ACCOUNT." It is perfectly clear 
that the fact of First Equity's agency, as broker, was before the 
court below. Furthermore, Appellant does not and has not changed 
its theory on appeal. First Equity continues to assert that it was 
the authorized agent of USU and that, as such, it is entitled to 
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compensation for its services and to be indemnified for losses 
it suffered in performing, at USUfs request, acts which were not 
manifestly illegal and which it had no knowledge were illegal (if 
in fact they were illegal, which First Equity also disputes). 
Finally, USU itself raised the question of whether or not a triable 
issue of fact is present with respect to the amount of individual 
grant monies that were available for investment in common stock. 
The court below ruled in USU's favor on that question and First 
Equity has merely emphasized the agency relationship to point out the 
error of the lower courtfs decision. This Court has no legal basis 
to ignore Appellantfs argument as USU suggests. 
In further response to Respondent^ suggestion that this Court 
disregard First Equityfs arguments on this question, the following 
language is cited: 
The rule requiring adherence to the theory 
relied on below does not mean that the parties 
are limited in the appellate court to the same 
reasons or arguments advanced in the lower court 
upon the matter or question in issue [citations 
omitted]. 
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal & Error §546. 
The question in issue before the lower court and before this 
Court is USUfs liability to First Equity for broker's commissions 
and losses. First Equity has simply offered on appeal an additional 
reason and argument for such liability; the argument is properly made. 
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USU argues on page 44 of its Brief that First Equity was the ; 
"other party to five contracts with USU whereby USU was to pay it 
commissions for its services.11 
USU attempts to counter First Equityfs agency analysis with 
the point that "a broker often acts as the agent of the seller as 
well as the buyer,11 at page 45 of its Brief. First Equity acknowledges 
the accuracy of this observation, but alleges that, on the factual 
record in this case, it is beside the point, since First Equity was 
USUfs agent in each of the transactions sued upon below. USU may 
not "concede" the point (Respondents Brief at page 45) but there 
is clearly evidence showing this to be the case. Attached as Exhibits 
to Plaintiff fs Complaint in this case are the confirmations of USU!s 
unsolicited orders, each of which bears the notation, in large black 
type, "AS BROKER, WE HAVE PURCHASED FOR YOUR ACCOUNT." In the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary (which evidence would of 
course have been within USUfs power to produce below), this Court 
and USU are bound by the language of the confirmations contained as 
part of the Record here. 7B U.C.A. §70A-8-319(c). 
USU then makes the surprising argument, unsupported by references 
to either the record or to authority that "those contracts were ultra 
vires", and "are as unenforceable as any other ultra vires contract 
for the performance of services." Appellant submits that there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that USU had no power to contract 
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with a broker for its services. Brokers have been known to deal in 
most of the ,!lawful,f securities described in §33-1-1, and Respondent 
clearly could not argue that a contract with a broker to purchase 
that type of security would be ultra vires. The brokerage contract 
is of course the same, notwithstanding the type of securities pur-
chased. USU is confusing what were in actuality two separate series 
of contractual transactions - one whereby it purchased and/or sold 
stock to or from a third party, and another whereby it employed 
First Equity to execute the first series of transactions as USUfs 
agent, in return for which services it promised to pay a fee. Since 
contracting for brokerage services is clearly within the proper 
powers of USU, the argument that the contracts between USU and First 
Equity are unenforceable because they were ultra vires is untenable. 
With respect to Respondent^ argument that First Equity, and 
not a third party, should bear the losses suffered in this case, 
Appellant observes both that the above analysis of USUfs contractual 
liability makes that argument superflous and second, that the cases 
Respondent cites as supporting its position are inappositee For 
example, in Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 52 F.2d 
382 (8th Cir., 1931) cited on page 46 of Respondent's Brief, the 
defendant agent was an agent for third parties, which third parties 
received illegal preferential transfers via the agent bank's actions. 
In contrast to an injured party not agent or principal in Hirning, i.e. 
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the insolvent bank entitled to "return of preferential transfers for 
proper distribution by the receiver, the instant case presents us 
with the quite distinct circumstance of a principal attempting to 
renegue on its contractual obligations to an agent on the grounds 
that it had no power to order the agent to buy and sell certain 
types of securities, even though it clearly did have power to agree 
to compensate the agent for services rendered. 
Inland Waterways v. Hardee, 100 F.2d 678, (D.C. Cir., 1938), 
revfd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 517, cited on page 47 of USUfs Brief, 
also involved a totally distinct factual situation. It was a suit by 
the receiver of the insolvent Commercial National Bank of Washington 
City against Inland Waterways Corp., the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant 
Fleet Corporation, and several other parties. The Merchant Fleet 
Corporation deposited funds belonging to its principal, (the United 
States government) with Commercial National Bank. It extracted from 
the Bank an illegal pledge of Bank assets (U.S. Bonds) to secure 
that deposit. Subsequent to the Bankfs insolvency the bonds had been 
sold and the Fleet Corporation had returned the funds to the U.S. 
Treasury. The Court, in explaining its decision that the Fleet 
Corporation must make good the proceeds of the bond sale to the 
insolvent Bank, said: 
The question, as we think, does not depend upon 
the ability of the receiver to trace the funds which 
the Corporation received from the assets of the bank, 
but is controlled by the rule that one who participates 
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in a breach of trust may be required either to 
account for the proceeds or respond in damages 
. . . o In this case the corporation deposited 
funds under its control in a national bank and 
received from the bank . . . security . « . . 
The pledge was unlawful . . . . When the Cor-
poration demanded and received and used the 
pledged security, . . . . a conversion of trust 
property ensued. [emphasis added] 
100 F.2d 678. 
Once again, the agent in the above case represented a third 
party principal not a plaintiff, and the injured party had suffered 
loss because of the agent. The agent itself had caused injury by 
a "breach of trust11 and a "conversion11 of trust property, as the 
emphasized portions above indicate. These facts in no way comport 
with those of this case, in which the principal seeks to avoid and 
to shift to its agent losses incurred because of its own acts and 
not by any wrongdoing or illegal act of its agent. In addition, 
the equitable considerations clearly uppermost in the minds of the 
Courts deciding the above cases have no application to the case at 
bar. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITYfS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE 35-DAY MARGIN 
REQUIREMENT OF REGULATION T DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE DEFENSE 
TO FIRST EQUITY'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 
1. Court Interpretation. 
USUfs unblushing conclusion to its abbreviated discussion 
of the case law dealing with the effect of a violation of Section 7 
-12-
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act11) is as 
follows: 
Judge Christofferson was eminently correct in 
following Avery in holding Regulation T to 
provide a complete and not just a partial defense. 
Respondent's Brief, at 56. 
First Equity agrees that the decision below was notable, but not for 
its correctness. Indeed, USU does not explain why it is able to 
conclude that the decision in Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971), was a worthy example 
to follow. The Avery decision was not in harmony with United States 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Exchange Act. See Mills v. 
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The grim result in 
Avery did not correspond to the equitable result in Pearlstein v. 
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), the case upon which 
the judge in Avery seemed to rely. The Avery judge also claimed to 
rely upon the unequivocal mandate of Congress and strong public policy 
considerations placing the burden of compliance solely upon brokers. 
328 F. Supp. at 681. But in 1971 Congress amended the Exchange Act 
to place the burden of compliance upon customers as well as brokers. 
See Section 7(f) of the Exchange Act; Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. Part 
224 (1975). Following that amendment, courts have begun to deny 
customers the recovery of damages from brokers in implied civil 
actions based upon unforeseen violations of Regulation T. See State 
-13-
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of Utah v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. Civil No. 
NC 74-46, Memorandum Opinion and Order (D. Utah, July 8, 1975); 
Newman v, Pershing & Co., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[95,060 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 1975); Bell v. J.P. 
Winer & Co., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
1195,002 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1975). 
USU makes the following representation as to the law on 
Regulation T at page 50 of its Brief: 
It is settled that a customer may recover damages 
from a broker in a civil lawsuit for violating 
Regulation T and, <a fortiori, that a customer may 
lawfully resist payment he would otherwise be 
obligated to make where the broker has violated 
Regulation T. 
In light of the enactments of Congress and the decisions of the 
federal courts, cited herein and in Appellant's Brief at 42, and in 
light of the decisions of the state appellate courts, such as 
DuPont, Glore, Forgan, Inc. v. Mariash, 75 Misc. 2d 450, 347 N.Y.S. 
2d 886 (1st Dept. 1973) and others cited in Appellantfs Brief at 
pages 46-47, USUfs representation is seen clearly as an abbreviated 
and unedifying misstatement of the law6 The decision below, which 
upholds USUfs simplistic representation, is "eminently" incorrect. 
2. Violation of a Contract of Adhesion. 
As an alternative Regulation T defense, Respondent claims 
that it is excused from paying First Equity because, in not making 
delivery within the 35-day margin requirement, Appellant breached 
i /. _ 
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the contracts of adhesion it imposed upon USU. Respondent fails 
to support this claim with any pertinent facts, or statutory or .". 
case law. 
The crux of USUfs argument is that the confirmations sent to 
USU to evidence the oral purchase agreements were contracts of adhe-
sion. In support of that position, USU alleges that (1) the confir-
mations were prepared by First Equity, (2) the language is "stock 
language11, and (3) no negotiations occurred with respect to that 
language. Such allegations, even if true, do not constitute over-
reaching and unconscionability such as is necessary to find a contract 
of adhesion. 
Someone has to prepare a written memorandum of an oral contract 
if a written record is to be kept and, under the conditions existing 
in the securities industry, it is less burdensome for the broker to 
prepare all such memoranda than for the broker to rely upon its 
customers to draft such documents. The applicable statute of frauds, 
Section 8-319(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7B U.C.A. §70A-8-
319(c), recognizes this practice and states: 
A contract for the sale of securities is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless 
. . . 
within a reasonable time a writing in confir-
mation of the sale or purchase and sufficient 
against the sender under paragraph (a) has been 
received by the party against whom enforcement 
is sought and he has failed to send written 
objection to its contents within ten days after 
its receipt . . . . 
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The Draftsmenfs Comment to this provision states: 
Paragraph (c) is particularly important 
in the relationship of broker and customer. 
Normally a great volume of such business is 
done over the telephone. Orders are executed 
almost immediately and confirmed on the same 
or the next business day, usually on standard 
forms which as to the broker more than meet 
the minimal requirements of paragraph (a). 
It is reasonable to require the customer to 
raise his objection, if any, within ten days 
after the confirmation has been received . . . • 
Draftsmen's Comment 2., [Current Materials Vol.2] UCC REP. SERV. 
118319. 
The practicalities of preparing these confirmations imposes 
upon the broker the necessity of using a standard form with "stock 
language" that is not negotiated with the customer. Furthermore, it 
would make no sense to negotiate the language which supposedly bothers 
USU because the language simply draws to the attention of the customer 
matters (1) which are required by law to be disclosed, or (2) which 
are a part of the law applicable to the transaction and part of the 
contract whether stated or not. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst 
Oil & Ref. Co.% 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Swenson v. File, 90 Cal. Rptr. 
580, 475 P.2d 852 (1970); Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 
541 (1965). 
Brokers realize that many of their investors are not sophistica-
ted and that such investors are not aware of the complex regulatory 
framework in which securities transactions take place. Thus, most 
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of the terms set forth on the confirmations seek to inform the 
investor of the laws applicable to the transaction, thereby reducing 
much of the potential for needless controversy which an oral contract 
often carries with it. 
In addition to the functional necessity for brokers to preapre 
confirmations, Rule 17a-3(a)(6) of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (l!SECfl) requires registered brokers to maintain a record 
of each brokerage order. See 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-3(a)(6). The same 
Rule requires that the memorandum of each brokerage order 
. . . shall show the terms and conditions of 
the order or instructions and of any modifi-
cation or cancellation thereof, the account 
for which entered, the time of entry, the 
price at which executed and, to the extent 
feasible, the time of execution or cancellation. 
Thus, each of First Equityfs confirmations contains on its face the 
necessary information and instructions, and then states: ffWe 
confirm this transaction subject to agreement on the reverse side.11 
Record at pages 111-149. The reverse side contains the terms and 
conditions affecting cash account brokerage orders under the bold 
heading "CONDITIONS.11 Record at page 272. 
The first condition informs the investor of the provisions of U.C.C. 
Section 8-319(c), stating: lfIt is agreed that. . . Fy]ou will report any 
errors immediately and/or notify us if not entirely in accordance with 
your understanding." This provisions calls to the customers attention 
-17-
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the fact that the contract may be altered if the confirmation slip 
is not entirely in accordance with his understanding. The changes 
are to be reported immediately because, after ten days, U.C.C. 
Section 8-319(c) makes the confirmation binding upon the parties. 
See Anderson v. Francis I. DuPont & Co,, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 500 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1971); Weiss v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co,, 443 
S.W. 2d 934 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969). 
The second condition, which is expressly applicable to this 
appeal, states in relevant part: "it is agreed that . . . [a] 11 
transactions are subject to the rules, regulations, requirements 
(including margin requirements) and customs of the Federal Reserve 
Board . . . ." This statement is clearly not negotiable because 
such rules and regulations would apply whether or not the foregoing 
language was expressly agreed to. Applicable law and regulation 
again have been drawn to the customerfs attention. 
The third paragraph of conditions, dealing with the hypotheca-
tion of securities, draws to the customer's attention the provisions 
of SEC Rule 8c-l(c), 17 C.F.R. §240.18-l(c). The last paragraph of 
conditions deals in part with disclosures that the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers ("N.A.S.D") requires its members to make. 
S>ee N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice, Art. Ill, §12, CCH N.A.S.D. 
MANUAL 1(2162. Also the last paragraph of conditions deals in part 
with the brokerfs rights upon the customerfs failure to make payment 
by the settlement date, which rights are a matter of law. See 
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Baldwin v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, 141 Colo. 529, 349 P.2d 
146 (1960); Mass v. Gordon, 101 So.2d 836 (Fla. App. 1958); Rosen-
stock v, Tormey, 32 Md. 169 (1870). These conditions were simply 
matters of law and regulations, some of which were required to be 
disclosed, which governed the transactions. Therefore, the claim 
that this "stock language11 was not negotiated between the parties 
makes no sense. The laws referred to in such "stock language11 ap-
plied to the transactions whether or not they were mentioned in 
the confirmations. 
Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, it is 
clearly improper to characterize these confirmations as contracts 
of adhesion. They are not cunningly devised contracts drafted by 
a powerful commercial unit and imposed upon an individual on an 
"accept this or get nothing" basis. See 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
Section 1376 (1960). There is no overreaching, no unconscionable 
imposition of liability, no attempt to so restrict the customer as 
to leave no avenue of escape. See New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. 
Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922). The confirmation slips 
are not contracts of adhesion. 
The second major flaw in Respondent's defense is that USU alleges 
that a failure to deliver the securities within 35 days constituted 
a sufficient breach of the contract to allow USU to rescind and 
incur no liability. The 35-day limit is not specified in the con-
firmations, nor is any right to rescind specified. USU relies 
solely on the provision that calls the customer's attention to the 
fact that the contract is subject to the "margin requirements" Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may c ntain errors.
of the Federal Reserve Board. Those margin requirements, as con-
strued by the courts, include much more than the 35-day limit pro-
vided by Regulation T. For example, Regulation X of the margin 
requirements placed the responsibility upon USU not to allow its 
purchases through First Equity to take longer than 35 days* It is 
clear that USU has voluntarily breached that provision; USU utilized 
First Equity because of the delays inherent in receiving stock 
certificates from a Florida brokerage house. Deposition of Catron 
at pages 118-19, 218-21. 
It has been judicially recognized that a strict construction of 
the margin requirements in favor of customers and against brokers 
extends the protection of the laws to a point where the purposes of 
the securities laws are impeded. Newman v. Pershing & Co., Inc., 
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. K95,060 (S.D.N.Y. 
April 4, 1975). A strict construction against brokers may tend to 
encourage customers to do as USU has done, to wit: (1) to utilize 
a broker who may perform the contracts in violation of Regulation T 
due to de minimus
 % unforeseeable human error, and (2) to then seek to 
place all the risk and liability of the transaction on the broker. 
Thus, a strict construction such as USU contends is necessary in 
this case encourages unlawful behavior rather than discouraging it. 
Furthermore, in construing the language of the confirmations, 
the Court is required to bear in mind the situation of the parties 
and the subject matter of the contract. In preparing the confirmation 
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the broker is not required to state anything about laws or regula-
tions applicable to the transaction, except for the limited disclosure 
required by Article III, Section 12 of the N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair 
Practice discussed previously. The broker does not have to inform 
his customer of the legal consequences that may flow from the trans-
action, but if he does not, the customer could embroil the broker 
in needless controversies, needless court actions could be institu-
ted, or the customer could continue to invest in an uninformed manner. 
If the broker exercises his discretion to inform his customer of the 
applicable laws, rules, and regulations, then, according to the 
interpretation of the confirmations that USU puts forward, the broker 
should be held strictly accountable for any alleged ambiguity in the 
confirmations. Such a rule would serve to discourage brokers from 
educating their customers and to encourage needless controversy. 
Finally, this Court cannot simply rely upon what USU erroneously 
refers to as "an accepted canon of statutory construction." Respondent's 
Brief at 57. That canon of construction can only come into play if 
there is an ambiguity in the contract and there is no ambiguity here. 
The contract refers to the margin requirements of the Federal Reserve 
Board and they are, of course, spelled out in the applicable laws 
and regulations. Such laws and regulations, as interpreted by the 
courts, do not include the right to rescind a brokerage contract for 
a
 ^£ minimus violation resulting from human error, particularly when 
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the party seeking to rescind is the party which encouraged the 
violation. Moreover, even if there is an ambiguity, which First 
Equity emphatically denies, there is another accepted canon of con-
struction which requires that comparatively unimportant matters which 
may be severed from the agreement without impairing its effect or 
changing its character, such as an educational reference to the 
applicable lax*, must be suppressed if in that way and only that 
way the agreement can be sustained and enforced. Rhoades v, 
Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 49 W. Va. 494, 39 S#E. 209 (1901). Needless 
to say, a battle of canons, such as USUfs Brief encourages, would 
only obfuscate the real issues. A broker simply is not required 
by law to insure its customer against all losses attendant to 
investing through a margin account. 
POINT IV 
FIRST EQUITY HAD NO CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ANY WITHDRAWAL OF 
CATRONfS AUTHORITY BECAUSE THE COLLECTING BANKS WERE NOT FIRST 
EQUITY1S AGENTS. 
Judge Christofferson concluded his memorandum decision by 
stating: 
In view of the above rulings, the court feels 
that it is unnecessary to comment on further 
defenses of Utah State, such as the First 
Security and Walker Bank and Trust Company 
being agents of the plaintiff and their know-
ledge that Catron had no authority to purchase 
common stock as a defense. The court feels 
that both have merit, but has indicated in 
view of the previous rulings the court feels 
further comment is unnecessary . . . . 
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The question of whether the banks were First Equity's agents is 
governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commericial Code, as 
Respondent has pointed out in its Brief, pages 59 and 60. Therein 
Respondent noted that 7B U.C.A. Section 70A-4-104(l)(g), provides: 
"item" means any instrument for the 
payment of money even though it is not 
negotiable but does not include money. 
Respondent also drew attention to the fact that 7B U.C.A. Section 
70A-4-105(d) states: 
"Collecting bank" means any bank handling 
the item for collection except the payor 
bank. 
Additionally, Respondent relied upon a somewhat analagous case, 
Phelan v. University Natfl Bank, 85 111. App. 2d 56, 229 N.E. 2d 
374 (1967), in which it was held that the stock broker could not 
recover from the bank for failure to pay for the securities because 
the bank was a "collecting bank" and not a "payor bank." 
Finally, Respondent cites 7B U.C.A. Section 70A-4-2Gl(l), 
which provides: 
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears 
and prior to the time that a settlement 
given by a collecting bank for an item is 
or becomes final, the bank is an agent or 
subagent of the owner of the item . . • . 
On that basis, USU claims that the banks involved in this case 
were the agents of First Equity and, therefore, First Equity is 
chargeable with whatever notice the bank officers received from 
reading news items that appeared in newspapers on December 15, 1973. 
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Record, at pages 326-27, 337-39. However, neither of the banks 
was acting as a collecting bank at that time. Record, at pages 
99-149, 160-62; Deposition, at pages 80-81. 
There are other clear reasons why the presumption of agency 
stated in Section 70A-4-201(l) should be disregarded in this case. 
First, the presumption was established for the purpose of settling 
the nature of the depositor-bank relationship in a situation where 
the collecting bank is being sued by the owner of the item that is 
deposited for collection. See Draftsmenfs Comments 1 and 2, [Current 
Materials Vol. 2] UCC REP. SERV. 1[4201. That purpose was well served 
in the Phelan case where the bank was named as a defendant, but there 
is no defendant bank here. Thus, the entire purpose for the pre-
sumption fails in this case. 
Furthermore, it is not true, as USU states, that Phelan involved 
"a factual situtation identical11 to the one in this case. Respondent1 
Brief at page 60. The court in PheIan stated that the broker-dealer 
in that case had sold common stock to the investor» implying certainlj 
that it was a "principal11 transaction rather than a "broker11 transac-
tion . In this case the broker purchased common stock for the 
investor. First Equity was not the owner of the securities, but 
simply acted as agent for USU in obtaining the securities and for-
warding them to USUfs designated banks. USU is also incorrect when 
it states that the "paper work involved in the instant case is even 
-24-
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identical to that in Phelan." Respondent's Brief at page 61. The 
transmittal letter to the defendant bank in Phelan stated: ffWe 
enclose for collection and remittance in Chicago funds only when 
actually paid." (Emphasis added). The instruction letter to First 
Security Bank simply states: "For delivery to a/c Utah State 
University against payment of draft attached ($67,019.00). Please 
credit our account WITH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IN JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA 
THRU WIRE ADVICE ATTENTION of the undersigned.11 (Emphasis added). 
(Record, at page 307). Thus, the function of each bank in this 
case was primarily one of receipt of stock certificates for USU, 
its account-holder. USU directed which bank should be used by 
First Equity for that purpose and the bank primarily accepted delivery 
for USU and paid out its account-holderfs funds to First Equity. In 
such a situation, it may be true that the banks are formally desig-
nated as collecting banks, but the presunption of agency should 
clearly be set aside. First Equity, acting as purchasing agent for 
USU, simply transferred securities to the banks, acting as receiving 
agents of USU. The banks were not First Equityfs agents. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's argument that the lower court decision denying 
First Equity's Motion for Summary Judgment should be upheld because 
"other defenses11 were available to USU is totally outside the scope 
of this appeal. Since the lower court did not rule on these matters 
(discussed at pages 65-72 of Respondent's Brief), the questions have 
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not been presented for appeal, and Respondent's arguments are 
not properly before this Court. 
In conclusion, Appellant urges that the orders of the lower 
court be reversed, and the case be remanded for trial on the issues 
which require further evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN 
By /s/ Randall P» Spackman 
Randall P. Spackman 
By /s/ Christine M. Durham 
Christine M. Durham 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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